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Abstract—Trust plays an important role in human life envi-
ronments. That is why the researchers has been focusing on
it for a long time. It allows us to delegate tasks and decisions
to an appropriate person. In social sciences trust between
humans was studied, but it also was analyzed in economic
transactions. A lot of computer scientists from different ar-
eas, like security, semantic web, electronic commerce, social
networks tried to transfer this concept to their domains. Trust
is an essential factor in any kind of network, whether social
or computer. Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are charac-
terized by severely constrained resources, they have limited
power supplies, low transmission bandwidth, small memory
sizes and limited energy, therefore security techniques used in
traditional wired networks cannot be adopted directly. Some
effort has been expended in this fields, but the concept of trust
is defined in slightly different ways by different researchers. In
this paper we will show how the family of Role-based Trust
management languages (RT) can be used in WSN. RT is used
for representing security policies and credentials in decentral-
ized, distributed access control systems. A credential provides
information about the privileges of users and the security poli-
cies issued by one or more trusted authorities.
Keywords—access control, role-based trust management, trust,
wireless sensor networks.
1. Introduction
The concept of trust can be understood in quite various
ways. Generally it can be based on personal experience,
reputation or recommendation. A lot of work connected
with trust has been done by sociologist, economists, psy-
chologists and lately also by computer scientist. It has
become very important in the late years as a consequence
of the growth of ﬁelds such as Internet transactions or elec-
tronic commerce.
Establishing trust in a network gives two important beneﬁts:
– it helps to make traditional security mechanisms
more robust and reliable,
– it can solve the problems that can not be solved
through traditional security mechanisms.
Wireless sensor networks are becoming increasingly im-
portant due to the growing range of their capabilities. The
range of applications of WSN is so wide that it tends to
invade our everyday life. The services oﬀered by wire-
less sensor networks can be classiﬁed into four major cat-
egories: monitoring, alerting, providing information, and
actuating. Their signiﬁcance is more and more important,
especially in relation to gathering information, in ﬁelds
such as health care, defence, environmental and structural
monitoring, homeland security, industry control, intelligent
green aircrafts, smart roads and others. There are many
applications which are intended to monitor physical and
environmental phenomena, such as ocean and wildlife, pol-
lution, earthquakes, and water quality. The main purpose
of these WSNs is to provide physical information such as
temperature, light, radiation, and others to a computer sys-
tem and it oﬀers eﬃcient solutions in a great variety of
application domains. The network can modify the state of
an external system (e.g., barriers, traﬃc lights, irrigation
system) according to the data, going beyond its sensing ca-
pabilities. In the future, a sensor network will survey our
health, home, the roads we follow, the oﬃce or the industry
we work in or even the aircraft we use, in an attempt to
enhance our safety.
It is a quite young technology with many interesting re-
search problems. One of the issues is security, and trust is
a part of it. Very often applications which use WSN require
high dependability. Also, networks which provide more so-
phisticated services require more eﬀective security mecha-
nism. Unfortunately, not all security solutions suitable for
traditional networks are appropriate for WSN, because of
their resource constraints.
Traditional trust management schemes that have been de-
veloped for wired and wireless ad-hoc networks are not
well suited for wireless sensor networks, due to their higher
consumption of resources such as memory and power. The
sensor nodes are highly constrained in terms of communi-
cation bandwidth, processing resources, computational ca-
pabilities, memory space, and battery capacity.
Some of the approaches adopted for WSN try to imitate
those for ad-hoc or peer-to-peer networks, but this is not
always possible due to the diﬀerence in the features of these
networks (like the computational power, energy-constraint
and also the size of the networks). In this work we will try
to show how our approach to the concept of trust manage-
ment can be adjusted to wireless sensor networks.
There are some works connected with trust used in sensor
networks to increase their security and reliability. Most
of these works are based, or take into consideration, the
concept of reputation. Quite often the trust is obtained as
a function of reputation. Reputation is the opinion of one
person about the other, in WSN it can be the opinion of
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one node about another. It can be built over time based on
the history of behavior of the node.
Guaranteeing that conﬁdential data and services oﬀered by
a computer system are not made available to unauthorized
users is an increasingly signiﬁcant and challenging issue,
which must be solved by reliable software technologies that
are used for building high-integrity applications. The data,
whether in electronic, paper or other form must be properly
protected. The traditional solution to this problem is ac-
cess control techniques by which users are identiﬁed, and
granted or denied access to a system, data and other re-
sources, depending on their individual or group identity.
This approach ﬁts well into closed, centralized environ-
ments in which the identity of users is known in advance.
However, access control in such a resource constrained
WSN provides signiﬁcant challenges, and in an ongoing
area of research and trust management is a speciﬁc kind of
access control in which decisions are based on credentials
issued by multiple principals.
The paper is organized as follows: An overview of the
work related to trust management in wireless sensor net-
works is given in Section 2. Section 3 shows the overview
of the family of Role-based Trust management languages,
including syntax and inference system over RT credentials.
Section 4 describes time validity in RT languages with in-
ference system. Final remarks are given in Conclusions.
2. Related Work
Trust has been the focus of researchers for a long time. It
origins derives from social sciences where trust between
humans was studied. Since Marsh [1] introduced a compu-
tational model for trust in his thesis, trust mechanism has
gradually obtained more and more researcher’s ([2], [3],
and so on) interest for its ﬂexibility and extensibility. Nu-
merous trust models were proposed in social network, dis-
tributed network, peer-to-peer computing, ad-hoc network,
and so on.
Although intuitively easy to conceive, the notion of trust
has not been formally deﬁned unanimously. Trust in wire-
less sensor network is yet to adopt a formal deﬁnition.
A dictionary deﬁnition states that trust is a belief or con-
ﬁdence in the honesty, goodness, skill or safety of a per-
son, organization or thing [4]. It means that such a belief
is based on explicit assessment of trustworthiness of the
trusted party.
There is a large diversity in the understanding of the con-
cept of trust. The concept of trust management in dis-
tributed systems was ﬁrst deﬁned in 1996, and the approach
presented by authors of this paper is based on this deﬁni-
tion. Along with the notion of trust, comes that of repu-
tation, which is the opinion of one person about the other,
of Internet buyer about an Internet seller, and one node in
wireless sensor network about another. Also, reliability is
connected with the trust concept. It was originally a mea-
sure of how long a machine can be trustworthy. Trust can
be understood as a derivation of the reputation of an entity.
Based on a reputation, a level of trust is granted upon an
entity. The reputation itself has been built over time based
on that entity’s history of behavior, and may be reﬂecting
a positive or negative assessment.
There are not many publications connected with the area
of trust management systems for wireless sensor networks.
Most of the work in this ﬁeld has been made in the last
few years (e.g., Reputation-based Framework for Sensor
Networks (RFSN) [5], Agent-based Trust and Reputation
Management (ATRM) [6], and Parameterized and Local-
ized Trust Management Scheme (PLUS) [7]). However, big
eﬀorts have been made in related areas such as introducing
the concept of trust management schemes for increasing se-
curity and reliability in peer-to-peer networks [8], [9] and
ad-hoc networks [10]–[16]. There are some other works
available in the literature, e.g., [17]–[22], and so forth, that
discuss trust in WSN but not in much detail.
Very often in the literature, trust has been used in WSNs for
assessing the availability, reliability, or security property of
a node (e.g., whether a node is malicious or not) based on
past interaction experiences [5], [23].
Ganeriwal et al. [5] were among the ﬁrst who deﬁned com-
prehensive trust management scheme for sensor networks.
They propose a reputation-based framework for high in-
tegrity sensor networks based on a bayesian formulation
(more speciﬁcally, a beta reputation system) where nodes
maintain reputation for other nodes, and use it to evaluate
their trustworthiness. The architecture of the framework
consists of a watchdog mechanism, reputation, second hand
information, trust, and behavior. In this framework each
sensor node maintains reputation metrics which both rep-
resent past behavior of other nodes, and are used as an
inherent aspect in predicting their future behavior. Reputa-
tion is stored in a table where the entries are built by the
nodes through the watchdog mechanism. Nodes not only
use their own direct observations, but they also exchange
information with other nodes (second hand information).
Reputation is calculated by using the beta reputation dis-
tribution and trust is obtained as a function of reputation.
Then the behavior of a node is given according to whether
the trust values are respectively above or below a given
threshold.
A watchdog mechanism is also used in Chen et al. [17].
In their work reputation is similarly used in order to deﬁne
a trust management system for wireless sensor networks.
Their model uses probability, statistics and mathematical
analysis. They consider the concept of certainty for trust.
The ﬁrst-hand information is aggregated by using a watch-
dog mechanism. A reputation space is deﬁned considering
the positive and negative outcomes, and trust space is de-
ﬁned from the reputation space. In [13] reputation is also
considered as a way for building trust.
In [22] Shaikh et al. propose a lightweight group based
trust management scheme (GTMS) for distributed wireless
sensor networks in which the whole group will get a single
trust value. Instead of calculating individual trust, in some
cases it is much more appropriate to calculate the trust for
the entire group. GTMS uses a hybrid trust management
scheme instead of using centralised or distributed schemes,
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which helps in keeping minimum resource utilisation at the
sensor nodes.
In [24] Yao et al. introduce a framework similar to exist-
ing approaches for ad-hoc networks where trust values are
assigned to each node. A trust evaluation process is per-
formed based on the localised trust model and two kinds of
knowledge: personal reference gained by interaction with
the evaluated node (suspect node) and reputation sent by
the juries (speciﬁc nodes).
Yao et al. [7] also propose a parametrised and localised
trust management scheme for WSN security, especially for
secure routing where each node maintains highly abstracted
parameters to evaluate its neighbours.
Aivaloglou and Gritzalis [23] show a hybrid trust and
reputation management protocol for WSNs by combining
certiﬁcate-based and behaviour-based trust evaluations.
Zhiying et al. [25] ﬁnd distributed trust models appropri-
ate for large-scale sensor network security design, because
each node focuses on the trustworthiness of its neighbours
and can assess if these nodes comply with agreed security
policies. Authors propose an appropriate security frame-
work with diﬀerent security schemes. Unfortunately, their
work does not take into consideration the resource limits
of nodes in sensor networks.
Zia in [26] proposes a security framework where integrating
the reputation and trust management mechanism is used
to provide a comprehensive security solution against well-
known threats. In this work nodes monitor their neighboring
nodes and rank the neighbors to execute a trust vote.
Momani et al. [27] also introduce a trust model and a repu-
tation system for WSNs based on sensing continuous data.
Chen et al. [28] propose a distributed agent-based trust
management scheme where each agent node monitors the
behavior of the nodes within its radio range, and broadcasts
their trust ratings.
As it was shown just above, there is a large diversity in the
understanding of the concept of trust, also in wireless sen-
sor networks. The term trust management was ﬁrst applied
in the context of distributed access control in [2] and the
approach presented here is based on this deﬁnition.
Traditional access control systems usually rely on Role-
Based Access Control model [29], [30] which groups the
access rights by the role name and limits the access to
a resource to those users who are assigned to a particular
role.
The ﬁrst trust management application described in the
literature was PolicyMaker [31] which deﬁned a special
assertion language capable of expressing policy statements,
which were locally trusted, and credentials that had to be
signed using a private key. The next generation of trust man-
agement languages were KeyNote [32], which was an en-
hanced version of PolicyMaker, SPKI/SDSI [33] and a few
other languages [34]. All these languages allowed assigning
privileges to entities and used credentials to delegate per-
missions from its issuer to its subject. What was missing
in those languages was the possibility of delegation based
on attributes of the entities and not on their identity.
Responding to this need, a family of Role-based Trust man-
agement languages has been introduced in [35]–[38], and
practical application using the RT language to control ac-
cess to virtual machines was presented in [39]. These lan-
guages have a well-deﬁned syntax and semantics, which
made them easy to extend in order to apply them to diﬀer-
ent needs. One of the extensions is the use of time validity
constraints of the credentials, which made the languages
of the RT family more realistic, because in the real world
permissions are usually given just for a limited period of
time. Time-dependant credentials were introduced in [40]
but only for RT0 language. Because RT T language is more
complex, powerful and allows to express security policies
more suited to real needs, we decided to develop extensions
to this speciﬁc language, which has not been done before.
The complex time-dependant inference system with neces-
sary proofs was introduced in [41].
3. Role-Based Trust Management
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [29], [30] is the
most ﬂexible type of access control policy. It uses user role
to control which users have access to particular resources.
Access rights are grouped by the role name and access to
resources is restricted to the users who are assigned to ap-
propriate roles. The meaning of roles in RT captures the
notion of groups of users in many systems and has been bor-
rowed from RBAC approach. This type of access control
works well in a large-scale centralized system and is often
used in enterprise environments. Quite diﬀerent challenges
arise in decentralized and open systems where the identity
of users is not known in advance and the set of users can
change. It is also diﬀerent in a wireless sensor network
where sets of sensors can change rapidly. The identity of
a user itself does not help in making decisions about their
rights. What is needed to make such decisions is infor-
mation about the privileges assigned to the user by other
authorities, as well as trust information about the authority
itself.
The term of trust management was introduced in 1996 by
Blaze et al. in [2] who deﬁned it as a uniﬁed approach
to specify and interpret security policies, credentials and
trust relationships. In a trust management system an entity’s
privilege is based on its attributes instead of its identity.
An entity’s attributes are demonstrated through digitally
signed credentials issued by multiple principals. A cre-
dential is an attestation of qualiﬁcation, competence or au-
thority issued to an individual by a third party. Examples
of credentials in real life include identiﬁcation documents,
driver’s licenses, membership cards, keys, etc. A credential
in a computer system can be a digitally signed document.
Such a concept of trust management has evolved since that
time to a much broader context of assessing the reliability
and developing trustworthiness for other systems and indi-
viduals [42]. In this paper, however, we will use the term
trust management only in a meaning restricted to the ﬁeld
of access control.
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The potential and ﬂexibility of trust management approach
stems from the possibility of delegation: a principal may
transfer limited authority over a resource to other princi-
pals. Such a delegation is implemented by means of an ap-
propriate credential. This way, a set of credentials deﬁnes
the access control strategy and allows deciding on who
is authorized to access a resource, and who is not. The
concept of delegation can also be used in a WSN, espe-
cially in routing structures that is why we will try to show
how the permissions can be delegated from one sensor to
another.
RT languages combine trust management and RBAC fea-
tures. To deﬁne a trust management system, a language
is needed for describing entities (principals and re-
questers), credentials and roles which the entities play in
the system.
The core language of RT family is RT0, described in de-
tail in [37]. It allows describing localized authorities for
roles, role hierarchies, delegation of authority over roles
and role intersections. All the subsequent languages add
new features to RT0, they are progressively increasing in
expressive power and complexity. RT1 introduces param-
eterized roles, which can represent relationships between
entities. RT2 extends RT1 with logical objects, which can
be used to represent permissions given to entities with re-
spect to a group of logically related objects (resources).
These extensions can help in keeping the notation concise,
but do not increase the expressive power of the language,
because each combination of parameters in RT1 and each
permission to a logical object in RT2 can be deﬁned alterna-
tively as a set of separate roles in RT0. The most powerful
language in the family is RT T , as it provides useful capa-
bilities not found in any other languages: manifold roles to
achieve both agreement of multiple principals from one set
and from disjoint sets and role-product operators, which can
express threshold and separation of duties policies. Simi-
lar to a role which deﬁnes a set of principals a manifold
role deﬁnes a set of principal sets, each of which is a set
of principals whose cooperation satisﬁes the manifold role.
A threshold policy requires a speciﬁed minimum number
of entities to agree on some fact, i.e., it requires agreement
among k out of a set of entities that satisfy a speciﬁed
condition, e.g., in a requirement that two diﬀerent bank
cashiers must authorise a transaction. Separation of du-
ties policy requires a set of entities, each of which fulﬁls
a speciﬁc role, to agree before access is granted.
RT D provides mechanism to describe delegation of rights
and role activations, which can express selective use of ca-
pacities and delegation of these capacities. In many scenar-
ios, an entity prefers not to use or delegate all his rights.
For example, if an entity D activates the role A.r to use
it in a session B, it can take the form of delegation creden-
tial, as a:
D D as A.r−−−−−→ B ,
where D as A.r is called a role activation. B can further
delegate this role activation to C by issuing the credential,
B D as A.r−−−−−→C .
An entity can issue multiple delegation credentials to an-
other entity and also, several role activations can be dele-
gated in one delegation credential.
The features of RT T and RT D can be combined together
with the features of RT0, RT1 or RT2. A more detailed
treatment of RT family can be found in [36].
The languages have a precise syntax and semantics deﬁni-
tion. A set-theoretic semantics, which deﬁnes the meaning
of a set of credentials as a function from the set of roles
into the power set of entities, has been deﬁned for RT0
[40], [37] and we deﬁned relational semantics which apply
also to other members of the family up to RT T in [43].
The logic-programming semantics of RT0 credentials was
ﬁrst introduced in [36], a modiﬁed version of this seman-
tics was shown in [40] and the semantics of all the other
languages up to RT T was described in [44]. The member
sets of roles can also be calculated in a more convenient
way using an inference system which deﬁnes an operational
semantics of RT languages. An inference system consists
of an initial set of formulae that are considered to be true,
and a set of inference rules that can be used to derive new
formulae from the known ones. The operational semantic
was described in [45] and [40].
Table 1
Supported features of RT languages
RT language Supported features
– localized authorities for roles,
RT0 – role hierarchies,
– delegation of authority over roles,
– attribute based delegation of authority,
– role intersections.
features of RT0 plus:
RT1 – parameterized roles,
– attribute-relationship based delegation,
– attribute-ﬁeld constraints.
RT2 features of RT1 plus:
– logical objects.
features of RT0 plus:
RT T – manifold roles,
– threshold policies,
– separation-of-duty policies.
features of RT0 plus:
RT D – selective use of role membership,
– dynamic credential delegation.
A summary of the features supported by particular RT lan-
guages is shown in Table 1.
3.1. The Syntax of RT Family Languages
Basic elements of RT languages are entities, role names,
roles and credentials. Entities represent principals that can
deﬁne roles and issue credentials, and requesters that can
make requests to access resources. An entity can, e.g., be
a person or program identiﬁed by a user account in a com-
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puter system or a public key. Role names represent per-
missions that can be issued by entities to other entities,
or groups of entities. Roles represent sets of entities that
have particular permissions granted according to the ac-
cess control policy. Credentials deﬁne roles by appointing
a new member of the role or by delegating authority to the
members of other roles.
There are six types of credentials in RT T (ﬁrst four can
also be used in RT0, RT1, and RT2) which are interpreted
in the following way:
A.r← B – simple membership: entity B is a mem-
ber of role A.r.
A.r← B.s – simple inclusion: role A.r includes (all
members of) role B.s. This is a del-
egation of authority over r from A to
B, because B may cause new entities
to become members of the role A.r by
issuing credentials that deﬁne B.s. The
hierarchy of roles is also possible.
A.r← B.s.t – linking inclusion: role A.r includes role
C.t for each C, which is a member
of role B.s. This is a delegation of au-
thority from A to all the members
of the role B.s. The expression B.s.t
is called a linked role.
A.r← B.s∩C.t – intersection inclusion: role A.r in-
cludes all the entities who are mem-
bers of both roles B.s and C.t. This is
a partial delegation from A to B and
C. The expression B.s∩C.t is called
an intersection role.
A.r← B.s⊙C.t – role A.r can be satisﬁed by a union
set of one member of role B.s and one
member of role C.t. A set consisting
of a single entity satisfying the inter-
section role B.s∩C.t is also valid.
A.r← B.s⊗C.t – role A.r includes one member of role
B.s and one member of role C.t, but
those members of roles have to be dif-
ferent entities.
3.2. Inference System over RT Credentials
RT credentials are used to deﬁne roles which are used to
represent permissions. The semantics of a given set P
of RT credentials deﬁnes for each role A.r the set of en-
tities which are members of this role. The member sets
of roles can also be calculated in a more convenient way
using an inference system, which deﬁnes an operational se-
mantics of RT language. An inference system consists of
an initial set of formulae that are considered to be true,
and a set of inference rules that can be used to derive new
formulae from the known ones.
Let P be a given set of RT credentials. The application
of inference rules of the inference system will create new
credentials, derived from credentials of the set P . A de-
rived credential c will be denoted using a formula P ≻ c
which should be read: credential c can be derived from
a set of credentials P .
Deﬁnition 1: The initial set of formulae of an inference
system over a set P of RT credentials are all the formulae:
c∈P for each credential c in P . The inference rules of the
system are the following:
c ∈P
P ≻ c
(W1)
P ≻ A.r← B.s P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻ A.r← X (W2)
P ≻ A.r← B.s.t P ≻ B.s←C
P ≻C.t ← X
P ≻ A.r← X
(W3)
P ≻ A.r← B.s∩C.t P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻C.t ← X
P ≻ A.r← X
(W4)
P ≻ A.r← B.s⊙C.t P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻C.t ← Y
P ≻ A.r← X ∪Y
(W5)
P ≻ A.r← B.s⊗C.t P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻C.t ← Y X ∩Y = φ
P ≻ A.r← X ∪Y
(W6)
There could be a number of inference systems deﬁned over
a given language. To be useful for practical purposes, an in-
ference system must exhibit two properties. First, it should
be sound, which means that the inference rules could de-
rive only formulae that are valid with respect to the se-
mantics of the language. Second, it should be complete,
which means that each formula which is valid according
to the semantics should be derivable in the system. Both
properties have been shown in [45], proving that the infer-
ence system provides an alternative way of presenting the
semantics of RT languages.
4. Time Validity in RT
Inference rules with time validity for RT0 were originally
introduced in a slightly diﬀerent way in [40]. In this paper,
we will show the extention of other languages, up to RT T
(by putting time validity constraints into this language).
In this case credentials are given to entities just for some
ﬁxed period of time. It is quite natural to assume that
permissions are given just for a ﬁxed period of time, not
forever.
The ability to infer credentials with incomplete information
is a signiﬁcant advantage of Role-based Trust management
in distributed systems. However, practical applications are
limited by the fact that in real life permissions can rarely
be given forever. The need to revoke a credential may not
be frequent, but when it occurs, it is crucial. Unfortu-
nately, revocation of credentials is not a simple extention
to the method – the system becomes non-monotonous. In
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this case access rights cannot be correctly inferred without
complete information about credentials or at least knowl-
edge which credentials have been explicitly revoked, and
which should be invalidated as inferred from the revoked
ones. Eﬀectively this ruins the system’s scalability.
A complete solution of the credential revocation problem is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it can be partially
addressed by limiting the validity of credentials to ﬁxed
periods of time. As will be shown, this does not aﬀect
the system’s ability to work with incomplete information
and limits the potential impact of credentials that would
otherwise be revoked. An additional eﬀect is the ability
to automatically identify outdated credentials, avoiding the
problem of unlimited growth of the credential database.
The restricted validity of credentials can also be used to
create a system enabling certiﬁcate revocation with an ar-
bitrary, but non-zero reaction time. Credentials valid for
long periods of time would not be used directly in this
case – instead they would be used to create periodically
(or on request) new credentials with short validity periods.
Revocation of a credential would then be a local action,
no more short-term credentials would be created and the
revocation would be guaranteed to be eﬀective as soon as
the last short-term credential becomes invalid.
Time dependent credentials take the form: c in v, meaning
”the credential c is available during the time v”. Finite
sets of time dependent credentials are denoted by CP and
the new language is denoted as RT T+ (as an extention of
the most powerful RT T language) To make notation lighter
we write c to denote ”c in (−∞, +∞)”. This type of
time constraints can satisfy the need of negation in non-
monotonic systems.
Time validity can be denoted as follows: [τ1,τ2]; [τ1,τ2);
(τ1,τ2]; (τ1,τ2); (−∞,τ]; (−∞,τ); [τ,+∞); (τ,+∞);
(−∞,+∞); v1 ∪ v2; v1 ∩ v2; v1\v2 and v1, v2 of any
form in this list, with τ ranging over time constants.
Time dependant credentials in wireless sensor networks can
be used in a form of credential templates. Credential tem-
plates know the precise time validity of credentials and
speciﬁc credentials know about narrowed period of time
(for example one day). When sensor need to use a creden-
tial, it does not have to ask each time (what consume some
resources) about the validity of credentials.
4.1. Inference System over RT T+ Credentials
Now, we can adapt inference system over RT credentials
to take time validity into account. Let CP be a given set
of RT T+ credentials. The application of inference rules of
the inference system will create new credentials, derived
from credentials of the set CP . A derived credential c
valid in time τ will be denoted using a formula C P ≻τ c,
which should be read: credential c can be derived from
a set of credentials C P during the time τ .
Deﬁnition 2: from [46] The initial set of formulae
of an inference system over a set CP of RT T+ credentials
are all in the form: c in v ∈ CP for each credential c
valid in time v in CP . The inference rules of the system
are the following:
c in v ∈ C P τ ∈ v
CP ≻τ c
(CW1)
C P ≻τ A.r← B.s CP ≻τ B.s← X
C P ≻τ A.r← X
(CW2)
CP ≻τ A.r← B.s.t CP ≻τ B.s←C
CP ≻τ C.t ← X
C P ≻τ A.r← X
(CW3)
CP ≻τ A.r← B.s∩C.t C P ≻τ B.s← X
CP ≻τ C.t ← X
C P ≻τ A.r← X
(CW4)
CP ≻τ A.r← B.s⊙C.t CP ≻τ B.s← X
C P ≻τ C.t ←Y
C P ≻τ A.r← X ∪Y
(CW5)
CP ≻τ A.r← B.s⊗C.t CP ≻τ B.s← X
CP ≻τ C.t ←Y X ∩Y = φ
C P ≻τ A.r← X ∪Y
(CW6)
4.2. Inferring Time Validity of Credentials
This inference system evaluates maximal time validity
when it is possible to derive the credential c from CP .
It enhances formula CP ≻τ c to CP ≻≻v c, specifying
that at any time τ ∈ v in which CP has a semantics, it
is possible to infer the credential c from CP . To make
notation lighter we write ≻≻ to denote ≻≻(−∞,+∞). The
inference rules of the system are the following:
c in v ∈ CP
CP ≻≻v c
(CW P1)
CP ≻≻v1 A.r← B.s C P ≻≻v2 B.s← X
CP ≻≻v1∩v2 A.r← X
(CW P2)
C P ≻≻v1 A.r← B.s.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s←C
CP ≻≻v3 C.t ← X
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r← X
(CW P3)
CP ≻≻v1 A.r← B.s∩C.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s← X
CP ≻≻v3 C.t ← X
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r← X
(CW P4)
CP ≻≻v1 A.r← B.s⊙C.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s← X
C P ≻≻v3 C.t ← Y
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r← X ∪Y
(CW P5)
C P ≻≻v1 A.r← B.s⊗C.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s← X
C P ≻≻v3 C.t ←Y X ∩Y = φ
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r← X ∪Y
(CW P6)
CP ≻≻v1 c CP ≻≻v2 c
CP ≻≻v1∪v2 c
(CW P7)
5. RT in Wireless Sensor Networks
Sensors have a limited source of power and it is hard to
replace or recharge, for example, sensors in the battle ﬁeld
or sensors in a large sea or forest. That is why it is so
important to save these resources. On the other hand, in
some cases the security of sensor network is crucial and
we can use some resources to protect WSN.
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Hierarchical routing, which is proposed to prolong the life-
time of WSNs, is one of the areas where it is possible to
use RT languages. Another important area may be dele-
gation of permissions in mobile networks, where RT D lan-
guage can be useful.
5.1. Hierarchical Routing
The hierarchical routing protocols classify sensor nodes ac-
cording to their functionalities. The main purpose of such
a division is to reduce the energy consumption. It is easy
to delegate the privileges between nodes which are simi-
lar. The network is divided into groups (or clusters) with
a leader sensor (or cluster node). The leader coordinates the
activities within the group and communicates with sensors
outside the own group. The diﬀerent schemes for hierar-
chical routing mainly diﬀer in how the leader is selected
and how the sensors behave in the inter and intra-group
domain.
Hierarchical routing is one of the ﬁelds where a delega-
tion of permission from the Role-based Trust management
family can be applied. For example, in a one-way com-
munication scenario, the group leader can broadcast the
message that his resources are running out, so he would
like to delegate its permissions to another sensor. It can
be assumed that he would do this on the condition that the
potential sensor has the proper credentials. What is needed
to make such decisions is information about the privileges
assigned to the potential sensor by other authorities, as well
as trust information about the authority itself. If the above
conditions are met, the leader can delegate its permissions
(and even role activation) to perform its role to another
sensor which is authorized to do that.
5.2. Permissions Delegation in a Mobile Networks
Mobile sensor networks are incredibly valuable, especially
in situations where traditional arrangement mechanisms
fail, or are not suitable. Also, in some application sce-
narios such as ocean monitoring, sensors move with the
ocean currents. The coverage of a mobile sensor network
depends not only on the initial network congurations, but
also on the mobility behavior of the sensors.
The locations covered by sensors change over time, they can
regroup in order to cover the range of the new area. In this
case, it is good idea to use one of the RT family languages,
RT D, which provides mechanisms to describe delegation
of role activations and selective use of role membership.
Sensors changing its location can delegate their permissions
to other sensors. Moving from one place to another, they
can change their roles and activate new ones. It is also
possible to delegate some of their rights to sensors towards
which they change their position. They may give up their
role in favor of other sensors. They can interact with some
sensors at speciﬁed periods of time, and with others in
other periods of time – depending on time validity of their
permissions.
6. Conclusions
Trust and trust management is an important issue in dis-
tributed wireless sensor networks. That is why it is more
and more often the subject of research scientists. Because
it can increase the security of the network, they can be used
more widely. The concept of trust and trust management
in wireless sensor network is deﬁned in a diﬀerent way, be-
cause it is used in a diﬀerent cases. As it was shown above,
the languages from the family of Role-based Trust manage-
ment can be applied to WSN. Because of the character of
this kind of network it is not suitable to use it in a small
WSN where just simple low-resource wireless sensors are
used, but in networks where the security is crucial. It is
also possible to use RT in a wireless sensor and actuator
networks.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Krzysztof Lasota for his contribution
to this work. I would also like to thank an anonymous
reviewer for very valuable and detailed comments.
References
[1] S. P. Marsh, “Formalising Trust as a Computational Concept”, Ph.D.
thesis, Dept. of Computing Science and Mathematics, University of
Stirling.
[2] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy, “Decentralized trust manage-
ment”, in Proc. 17th IEEE Symp. Secur. Priv., Oakland, CA, USA,
1996, pp. 164–173.
[3] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. D. Tygar, “SPINS:
Security protocols for sensor networks”, in Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Mob.
Comput. Netw. MobiCom 2001, Rome, Italy, 2001, pp. 189–199.
[4] “Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary” [Online]. Available:
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
[5] S. Ganeriwal and M. B. Srivastava, ”Reputation-based framework for
high integrity sensor networks”, in Proc. 2nd ACM Worksh. Secur.
Ad Hoc Sensor Netw., Washington, DC, USA, 2004, pp. 66–77.
[6] A. Boukerche, X. Li, and K. EL-Khatib, “Trust-based security for
wireless ad hoc and sensor networks”, Comp. Commun., vol. 30,
pp. 2413–2427, 2007.
[7] Z. Yao, D. Kim, and Y. Doh, “PLUS: Parameterized and localized
trust management scheme for sensor networks security”, in Proc.
3rd IEEE Int. Conf. Mob. Ad-Hoc and Sensor Syst. MASS-2006,
Vancouver, Canada, 2006, pp. 437–446.
[8] M. Gupta, P. Judge, and M. Ammar, “A reputation system for peer-
to-peer networks”, in Proc. 13th Int. Worksh. Netw. Operating Sys.
Support Digit. Audio Video NOSSDAV 2003, Monterey, CA, USA,
2003, pp. 144–15.
[9] L. Xiong and L. Liu, “Peer trust: Supporting reputation-based trust
for peer-to-peer electronic communities”, IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data
Eng., vol. 16, no. 7, pp. 843–857, 2004.
[10] S. Buchegger and J. L. Boudec, “Performance analysis of the CON-
FIDANT protocol”, in Proc. 3rd ACM Int. Symp. Mob. Ad Hoc Netw.
Comput. MobiHoc 2002, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2002.
[11] S. Buchegger and J. Y. L. Boudec, “A robust reputation system for
peer-to-peer and mobile ad-hoc networks”, in Proc. 2nd Worksh.
Econom. Peer-to-Peer Sys. P2PEcon 2004, Cambridge, MA, USA,
2004.
[12] P. Michiardi and R. Molva, “CORE: a collaborative reputation mech-
anism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks”,
in Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security, B. Jerman-
Blazic and T. Klobucar, Eds. Kluwer 2002, pp. 107–121.
76
How the Role-Based Trust Management Can Be Applied to Wireless Sensor Networks
[13] Y. Rebahi, V. E. Mujica-V, and D. Sisalem, “A reputation-based trust
mechanism for ad-hoc networks”, in Proc. 10th IEEE Symp. Comp.
Commun. ISCC 2005, Murcia, Spain, 2005, pp. 37–42.
[14] Y. L. Sun, W. Yu, Z. Han, and K. J. R. Liu, “Information theoretic
framework of trust modeling and evaluation for ad hoc networks”,
IEEE J. Selec. Areas in Commun., vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 305–317, 2006.
[15] G. Theodorakopoulos and J. S. Baras, “On trust models and trust
evaluation metrics for ad hoc networks”, IEEE J. Selec. Areas in
Commun., vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 318–328, 2006.
[16] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and T. Virtanen, “Trust evaluation based security
solutions in ad hoc networks”, in Proc. 7th Nordic Worksh. Secur.
IT Syst., Gjovik, Norway, 2003.
[17] H. Chen, H. Wu, X. Zhou, and C. Gao, “Reputation-based trust in
wireless sensor netwoks”, in Proc. Int. Conf. Multim. Ubiq. Engin.
MUE 2007, Seoul, Korea, 2007.
[18] K. Daniluk and E. Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, “A survey of energy
eﬃcient security architectures and protocols for wireless sensor net-
works”, J. Telecom. Inform. Technol., no. 3, pp. 64–72, 2012.
[19] K. Lasota, E. Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, and A. Kozakiewicz,
“Adaptacja rozwiązań honeypot dla sieci czujników”, in Proc. Kon-
ferencja Sieci Komputerowe SK-12, Szczyrk, Poland, 2012, Studia
Informatica, vol. 33, no. 3A, pp. 139–148 (in Polish).
[20] K. Lasota, E. Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, and A. Kozakiewicz,
“Mobilny honeypot dla sieci sensorycznych”, Przegląd Telekomu-
nikacyjny, no. 8–9, pp. 699–704, 2012 (in Polish).
[21] M. Momani, S. Challa, and K. Aboura, “Modelling trust in wireless
sensor networks from the sensor reliability prospective”, in Innova-
tive Algorithms and Techniques in Automation, Industrial Electron-
ics and Telecomm., T. Sobh et al., Eds. Heidelberg: Springer, 2007,
pp. 179–189, pp. 317–321.
[22] R. A. Shaikh, H. Jameel, S. Lee, S. Rajput, and Y. J. Song, “Trust
management problem in distributed wireless sensor networks”, in
Proc. 12th IEEE Conf. Embedd. Real-Time Comput. Syst. Appl.
RTCSA 2006, Sydney, Australia, 2006, pp. 411–414.
[23] E. Aivaloglou and S. Gritzalis, “Hybrid trust and reputation
management for sensor networks”, Wirel. Netw., vol. 16, no. 5,
pp. 1493–1510, 2010.
[24] Z. Yao, D. Kim, I. Lee, K. Kim, and J. Jang, “A security frame-
work with trust management for sensor networks”, in Proc. Worksh.
of the 1st Int. Conf. Secur. Priv. Emerg. Areas in Commun. Netw.
SecureComm 2005, Athens, Greece, 2005, pp. 190–198.
[25] Y. Zhiying, K. Daeyoung, L. Insun, K. Kiyoung, and J. Jongsoo,
“A security framework with trust management for sensor networks”,
in Proc. 1st Int. Conf. Secur. Priv. Emerg. Areas in Commun. Netw.
SecureComm 2005, Athens, Greece, 2005.
[26] T. A. Zia, “Reputation-based Trust Managmenet in Wireless Sensor
Networks”, in Proc. Int. Conf. Intell. Sensors, Sensor Netw. Inform.
Proces. ISSNIP 2008, Sydney, Australia, pp. 163–166.
[27] M. Momani and S. Challa, “Trust management in wireless sensor
networks”, in Proc. 5th ACM Conf. Embedded Netw. Sensor Syst.,
Sydney, Australia, 2007.
[28] H. Chen, H. Wu, X Zhou, and C. Gao, “Agent-based trust model in
wireless sensor networks”, in Proc. 8th ACIS Int. Conf. Softw. Engin.
Artif. Intell., Netw. Parallel/Distrib. Comput., Qingdao, China, 2007.
[29] D. F. Ferraiolo, R. S. Sandhu, S. I. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn, and R.
Chandramouli, “Proposed NIST standard for role-based access con-
trol”, ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 3, pp. 224–274, 2001.
[30] R. S. Sandhu, E. J. Coyne, H. L. Feinstein, nad C. E. Youman,
“Role-based access control models”, IEEE Computer, vol. 2,
pp. 38–47, 1996.
[31] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum and M. Strauss, “Compliance checking in
the policymaker trust management system”, in Proc. 2nd Int. Conf.
Finan. Cryptogr., London, UK, 1998, pp. 254–274.
[32] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Ioannidis, and A. Keromytis, “The role
of trust management in distributed systems security”, in LNCS Se-
cure Internet Programming: Security Issues for Mobile and Dis-
tributed Objects, J. Vitek and C. D. Jensen, Eds. Springer, 1999,
pp. 185–210.
[33] D. Clarke, J.-E. Elien, C. Ellison, M. Fredette, A. Morcos, and
R. L. Rivest, “Certiﬁcate chain discovery in SPKI/SDSI”, J. Comp.
Secur., vol. 9, pp. 285–322, 2001.
[34] P. Chapin, C. Skalka, and X. S. Wang, “Authorization in trust man-
agement: features and foundations”, ACM Comp. Surv., vol. 3,
pp. 1–48, 2008.
[35] N. Li and J. Mitchell, “RT: A Role-Based Trust-Management Frame-
work”, in Proc. 3rd DARPA Inform. Survivabil. Conf. Expos., Wash-
ington, DC, USA, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2003, pp. 201–212.
[36] N. Li, J. Mitchell, and W. Winsborough, “Design of a role-based
trust-management framework”, in Proc. IEEE Symp. Secur. Priv.,
Oakland, CA, USA, 2002, pp. 114–130.
[37] N. Li, W. Winsborough, and J. Mitchell, “Distributed credential
chain discoveryin trust management”, J. Comp. Secur., vol. 1,
pp. 35–86, 2003.
[38] M. R. Czenko, S. Etalle, D. Li, and W. H. Winsborough, “An intro-
duction to the role based trust management framework RT”, Tech.
Rep. TR-CTIT-07-34, Centre for Telematics and Information Tech-
nology University of Twente, Enschede, 2007.
[39] K. Lasota and A. Kozakiewicz, “Model of user access control to
virtual machines based on RT – family trust management language
with temporal validity constrains – practical application”, J. Telecom.
Inform. Technol., no. 3, pp. 13–21, 2012.
[40] D. Gorla, M. Hennessy, and V. Sassone, “Inferring dynamic creden-
tials for role-based trust management”, in Proc. 8th ACM SIGPLAN
Conf. Princip. Pract. Declarat. Program. PPDP 06, Venice, Italy,
2006, pp. 213–224.
[41] A. Felkner and A. Kozakiewicz, “RT T+ – time validity constraints
in RT T language”, J. Telecom. Inform. Technol., no. 2, pp. 74–82,
2012.
[42] W. M. Grudzewski, I. K. Hejduk, A. Sankowska, and M. Wańtu-
chowicz, Trust Management in Virtual Work Environments: A Hu-
man Factors Perspective. CRC Press, 2008.
[43] A. Felkner and K. Sacha, “The semantics of role-based trust manage-
ment languages”, in Advances in Software Engineering Techniques,
T. Szmuc, M. Szpyrka, J. Zendulka, Eds., LNCS 7054. Heidelberg:
Springer, 2012, pp. 179–189.
[44] A. Felkner and A. Kozakiewicz, “Kontrola dostępu w rozproszonych
systemach – trzy semantyki języka RT T ”, in Proc. II Konferencja
i3: internet – infrastruktury – innowacje, Wrocław, Poland, 2010 (in
Polish).
[45] A. Felkner and K. Sacha, “Deriving RT T credentials for role-based
trust management”, e-Inform. Software Engin. J., vol. 4, no. 1,
pp. 9–19, 2010.
[46] A. Felkner and A. Kozakiewicz, “Time validity in role-based trust
management inference system”, in Proc. Int. Worksh. Sec. Trust
Comput., Data Manag., and Appl. IWCS-11, Loutraki, Greece, 2011,
Communications in Computer and Information Science, Springer,
2011, vol. 187, pp. 7–15.
Anna Felkner graduated from
the Faculty of Computer Sci-
ence of Białystok University
of Technology (M.Sc., 2004)
and the Faculty of Electronics
and Information Technology of
Warsaw University of Technol-
ogy (Ph.D., 2010). At present
she is an Assistant Professor at
Network and Information Secu-
rity Methods Team in NASK
Research Division. Main scientiﬁc interests concern the
security of information systems, especially access control
and trust management.
E-mail: anna.felkner@nask.pl
Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK)
Wąwozowa st 18
02-796 Warsaw, Poland
77
